Forum dYdX Community Forum

Hi all, I’m researching dYdX governance and protocol development for a final project, and this thread is the closest fit for my question. Since the Labs team moved to Arcus in July, who is driving protocol development on dYdX Chain today: the subDAOs and the validators, or does Labs still maintain the core v4-chain repo? I can see commits still landing there, at a lower rate than before, so I’d rather describe the current setup accurately than guess at it. A related point, if anyone can confirm it: is there a target date for switching the chain’s collateral asset from Noble USDC to Circle-issued USDC on Injective, and does that require anything from a regular trader, or is it handled entirely at the protocol level?

Summary This proposal seeks to wind down and move the following 5 markets to final settlement: ARKM‑USD SHIB‑USD WOO‑USD XPL‑USD ZRO‑USD These markets fail liquidity‑tests (a tiny market order of $100 incurred ~30% slippage) and they also show extremely low trading activity throughout September. Rationale The selected markets exhibit weak market activity and limited effective liquidity. All 5 markets failed the liquidity‑test, where a $100 market order incurred slippage approaching 30% , indicating insufficient depth for safe trading. Additionally, most markets had minimal daily volume during the evaluation period. Only SHIB‑USD showed a single‑day spike (~$87k), while all other markets remained below $25k daily. Open interest levels were also low, with only SHIB‑USD and ZRO‑USD showing OI above $25k. Market details: ARKM‑USD: Median 24h volume: $0 Median OI: $5,620 Median spread: 0.89% WOO‑USD: Median 24h volume: $0 Median OI: $611 Median spread: 0.99% ZRO‑USD: Median 24h volume: $6 Median OI: $19,113 Median spread: 1.00% XPL‑USD: Median 24h volume: $10 Median OI: $7,509 Median spread: 0.90% SHIB‑USD: Median 24h volume: $12,444 Median OI: $18,712 Median spread: 1.21% Markets with low trading activity, limited open interest, and persistently wide spreads do not provide meaningful execution quality and reduce overall market efficiency Further data insights Volume charts: Open interest last weeks: Motivation Delisting these markets will: Improve overall market quality and tradi

Summary This proposal seeks to wind down and move the following 5 markets to final settlement: ARKM‑USD SHIB‑USD WOO‑USD XPL‑USD ZRO‑USD These markets fail liquidity‑tests (a tiny market order of $100 incurred ~30% slippage) and they also show extremely low trading activity throughout September. Rationale The selected markets exhibit weak market activity and limited effective liquidity. All 5 markets failed the liquidity‑test, where a $100 market order incurred slippage approaching 30% , indicating insufficient depth for safe trading. Additionally, most markets had minimal daily volume during the evaluation period. Only SHIB‑USD showed a single‑day spike (~$87k), while all other markets remained below $25k daily. Open interest levels were also low, with only SHIB‑USD and ZRO‑USD showing OI above $25k. Market details: ARKM‑USD: Median 24h volume: $0 Median OI: $5,620 Median spread: 0.89% WOO‑USD: Median 24h volume: $0 Median OI: $611 Median spread: 0.99% ZRO‑USD: Median 24h volume: $6 Median OI: $19,113 Median spread: 1.00% XPL‑USD: Median 24h volume: $10 Median OI: $7,509 Median spread: 0.90% SHIB‑USD: Median 24h volume: $12,444 Median OI: $18,712 Median spread: 1.21% Markets with low trading activity, limited open interest, and persistently wide spreads do not provide meaningful execution quality and reduce overall market efficiency Further data insights Volume charts: Open interest last weeks: Motivation Delisting these markets will: Improve overall market quality and tradi

We’ve submitted proposal-396 . Don’t miss the change to vote!

Summary The dYdX Treasury SubDAO has completed an ad hoc review of the Staking Program . Unlike our periodic reviews, this cycle was driven by validator availability rather than performance. Two validators are leaving the active set, a legacy node was retired, and the largest delegation within the designated proposer set was brought back in line with its peers. A total of 10,204,150 DYDX was redelegated across 17 transactions on 8 September 2026 . Every movement was executed as a redelegation rather than an unbonding: the stake continued earning throughout and never left the bonded state. Background The Treasury SubDAO periodically reassesses delegations to ensure that the validator set remains decentralised and resilient, operationally high-performing, economically sustainable, and actively contributing to governance, in alignment with the broader objectives of the dYdX community. Three developments prompted this cycle: Figment is winding down its dYdX validator operations Imperator.co has been jailed and has confirmed that it is leaving the active set Citadel.one’s legacy node was jailed and unbonded Delegation update For this rebalance, the Treasury SubDAO considered approximately 90.0M DYDX delegated in total. This figure includes the Staking address , the Buyback address and the Osmosis LP address . The 10,204,150 DYDX redeployed came from four sources: Source Amount (DYDX) Reason Figment 3,452,051 Full exit — winding down Keplr 3,496,300 Partial reduction — concentratio

Summary The dYdX Treasury SubDAO has completed an ad hoc review of the Staking Program . Unlike our periodic reviews, this cycle was driven by validator availability rather than performance. Two validators are leaving the active set, a legacy node was retired, and the largest delegation within the designated proposer set was brought back in line with its peers. A total of 10,204,150 DYDX was redelegated across 17 transactions on 8 September 2026 . Every movement was executed as a redelegation rather than an unbonding: the stake continued earning throughout and never left the bonded state. Background The Treasury SubDAO periodically reassesses delegations to ensure that the validator set remains decentralised and resilient, operationally high-performing, economically sustainable, and actively contributing to governance, in alignment with the broader objectives of the dYdX community. Three developments prompted this cycle: Figment is winding down its dYdX validator operations Imperator.co has been jailed and has confirmed that it is leaving the active set Citadel.one’s legacy node was jailed and unbonded Delegation update For this rebalance, the Treasury SubDAO considered approximately 90.0M DYDX delegated in total. This figure includes the Staking address , the Buyback address and the Osmosis LP address . The 10,204,150 DYDX redeployed came from four sources: Source Amount (DYDX) Reason Figment 3,452,051 Full exit — winding down Keplr 3,496,300 Partial reduction — concentratio

Summary This proposal seeks to reduce the size of the dYdX Chain’s active validator set from 31 to 21. Abstract Following the reduction in the dYdX Chain validator set to 31 in March 2026, several validators have wound down operations, and the active set currently has only 29 filled slots as on 11 September 2026. Network activity has also declined materially over the same period: average daily trading volume has fallen from approximately $121.2M in June 2026 to approximately $40.2M over the trailing 30 days (a decrease of roughly 67%). The decline has continued into September, with the trailing 7-day average down to approximately $31.5M/day (roughly 74% below June)*. At the same time, stake weight remains heavily concentrated at the top of the set; the 10 validators ranked #22 – #31 collectively hold only 5.4% of total active-set stake, and several of them are only marginally active (one moniker is currently labeled “Shutting Down”, the bottom two combined hold roughly ~21,000 DYDX, 0.01% of total stake)*. This proposal seeks to change the `max_validators` parameter from 31 to 21, aligning the on-chain limit with the current scale of network activity and the actual distribution of stake. Motivation Coordination and governance efficiency. A smaller, more engaged validator group improves responsiveness during upgrades or incidents, reduces coordination overhead in critical situations, and keeps the governance process efficient. dYdX operates with a Designated Proposer Set of 8

Summary This proposal seeks to reduce the size of the dYdX Chain’s active validator set from 31 to 21. Abstract Following the reduction in the dYdX Chain validator set to 31 in March 2026, several validators have wound down operations, and the active set currently has only 29 filled slots as on 11 September 2026. Network activity has also declined materially over the same period: average daily trading volume has fallen from approximately $121.2M in June 2026 to approximately $40.2M over the trailing 30 days (a decrease of roughly 67%). The decline has continued into September, with the trailing 7-day average down to approximately $31.5M/day (roughly 74% below June)*. At the same time, stake weight remains heavily concentrated at the top of the set; the 10 validators ranked #22 – #31 collectively hold only 5.4% of total active-set stake, and several of them are only marginally active (one moniker is currently labeled “Shutting Down”, the bottom two combined hold roughly ~21,000 DYDX, 0.01% of total stake)*. This proposal seeks to change the `max_validators` parameter from 31 to 21, aligning the on-chain limit with the current scale of network activity and the actual distribution of stake. Motivation Coordination and governance efficiency. A smaller, more engaged validator group improves responsiveness during upgrades or incidents, reduces coordination overhead in critical situations, and keeps the governance process efficient. dYdX operates with a Designated Proposer Set of 8