The Lebanese tragedy: who is to blame? forum

After Lebanon’s long civil war and again after the 2006 war, the country undertook reconstruction. Although the programme following the civil war succeeded in restoring some core infrastructure, it also built-up fiscal liabilities and left the administrative capacity in a fragmented state, while the response after 2006 was split between competing political groups at home and among donors (Dibeh, 2005; Hadad-Zervos, 2005; Hamieh and Mac Ginty, 2010; IMF, International Monetary Fund, 2010). The country is now having to embark on another round of reconstruction from a much weaker position. The relevant question is therefore not how much financing can be mobilised, but whether each commitment is linked to a verified need, involves a transparent procurement process, is linked to clearly defined executing and operating institutions, and is based on a liability that is in line with the state’s ability to repay. This article proposes an operational mechanism for establishing that connection: a Reconstruction Finance and Accountability Compact. It begins by examining the extent of current preliminary reconstruction needs and the financial situation, then examines five recurring limitations in Lebanon’s reconstruction history. The proposed compact addresses these constraints through a unified project registry, an asset-based framework for allocating financing, four milestone-based disbursement gates, a debt-and-banking firewall and a public asset map. The compact is designed as a commo

Cereals are the backbone of diets in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, with wheat alone accounting for more than half of total calorie intake in many nations. But the region’s arid climate, limited arable land and water scarcity constrain local agricultural production, making MENA heavily reliant on imports to meet domestic demand, despite being cereal producers and exporters. The MENA region is one of the most food-import-dependent areas in the world, particularly for staple cereals such as barley, maize and wheat. But while import dependence is largely unavoidable given the region’s structural constraints, dependence on a limited number of foreign suppliers is not. Diversifying import sources has become an essential strategy for strengthening food security and improving resilience to geopolitical and climate-related disruptions. Import concentration and dependence In a previous article on The Forum , we showed how six MENA countries – Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia – are highly dependent on cereal imports, as they import between 43% and 99% of their cereal consumption needs (Karam et al, 2026). While import dependence may take a longer time to adjust through increased productivity or land reclamation, and could also be unavoidable, reliance on a small number of supplying countries is not inevitable. One of the major sources of vulnerability to external shocks is a high import market concentration – that is, a country’s reliance on a small

Egypt is an energy-intensive economy at a turning point, and the debate over how to grow without cheap energy is no longer academic. Primary energy consumption rose by 5% in 2024 to around 98 million tonnes of oil-equivalent, reversing two years of decline, while fossil fuels still generate more than four-fifths of electricity (Enerdata, 2024; Low Carbon Power, 2025). Since 2014, Egypt has gradually reformed electricity and fuel pricing under its reform programme supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), reducing subsidies that once consumed more than a fifth of the national budget (Climate Action Tracker). As fiscal pressures, fuel import dependence and environmental costs have increased, energy efficiency has become an economic necessity rather than a technical option. It offers a cost-effective way to reduce energy demand, improve energy security, ease pressure on public finances and lower emissions while supporting economic growth. Greater energy efficiency also contributes to Egypt’s commitments under the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly numbers 7, 9, 12 and 13. Yet financing for energy efficiency projects remains far below the level needed, raising a critical question: why is investment still not flowing? Barriers to investment: insights from stakeholders To find out, we interviewed banks, project developers and public officials across the sector. Limited access to finance emerged as one of the most important constraints identified‚ though not the o

One of the central tools in the foreign policy of the United States and other major economic powers against targets in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), such as Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Yemen, has been the use of economic sanctions (Morgan et al, 2023). The attractive feature of this tool is rather clear from the sender’s perspective: sanctions promise leverage without the need for costly and risky military operations. But the outcomes of such economic pressures and their success rates are uncertain. Sanctions have sometimes coincided with political transitions from autocratic structures towards more democratic and pro-Western regimes (perhaps the examples of Serbia in 2000 or South Africa in 1990-94), while in other cases they have coincided with strengthened authoritarian rule and radicalisation (like Iraq under Saddam Hussein, 1990-2003, or North Korea). They may also contribute to pathways towards armed conflict by increasing the risk of miscalculation by both the sender and the target of sanctions (the case of Iran, 2025-26; see also Farzanegan, 2026, on how sanctions can lower the threshold for war). One lesson from these examples is that the association between sanctions and political stability or conflict may depend on the local institutions of target countries. The capacity of a state under sanctions to absorb shocks, including through control of information or the organisation and funding of repressive power, may shape how sanctions are absorbed and wh

Across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), investment has become central to economic transformation. Gulf states are deploying capital into infrastructure, tourism, logistics, advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence and renewable energy. Elsewhere, countries such as Egypt and Morocco are investing in infrastructure and industrial capacity while seeking greater private investment. The scale of this ambition is significant. But I believe the region now needs to ask a harder question: not how much it invests, but how much productivity those investments ultimately create. By productivity, I refer primarily to the ability of economies and firms to generate more value from their existing resources through greater efficiency, technological adoption, skills and innovation. The capabilities discussed below are therefore not productivity itself, but the mechanisms through which investment can generate sustained productivity gains. The World Bank’s 2025 assessment of the region points to the underlying challenge. MENA’s private sector remains insufficiently dynamic: relatively few firms invest in physical capital, workforce development or innovation, while barriers to firm entry and exit continue to weaken competition and productivity. The regional evidence supports treating conversion – not investment volume alone – as the central issue. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) analysis for 1995-2023 shows continued capital deepening in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) coun